SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN SECOND CIRCUIT LAW:
A TRIBUTE TO ROGER J. MINER
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents for the first
time, as a tribute to the Honorable Roger J. Miner, synopses of recent
cases from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In
so doing, we hope to honorJudge Miner's outstanding accomplishments
on the bench, and to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of
some of the more interesting changes in significant areas of Second
Circuitpractice.
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CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE-COVERT

ENTRY WARRANTS-EviDENCE ACQUIRED BY MEANS OF A COVERT ENTRY WARRANT
WILL NOT BE SUPPRESSED FOR LACK OF NOTICE UNLESS THE

SEARCH PREJUDICED THE SUSPECT, OR THERE WAS INTENTIONAL DISREGARD OF THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT-United

States v. Pangburn, 983 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1993).
California Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement (BNE) agents
targeted Frank J. Salcido, after federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents in New York advised the California
BNE about precursor chemical shipments to Salcido. 983 F.2d at
450. Based on the DEA's information and other details gathered
from BNE's investigation, a BNE agent secured a covert entry
warrant from a California municipal court judge. The covert entry warrant authorized BNE agents to search, without seizing,
Salcido's storage locker. The warrant did not provide, however,
that the agents give notice of the covert search to Salcido.
BNE agents executed the covert entry warrant and discovered precursor chemicals in Salcido's storage locker. A second
covert entry warrant was sought for Salcido's locker based upon
evidence garnered from the first covert search. The second warrant, which also lacked a notice provision, was promptly issued
and executed. Finally, a conventional search and seizure warrant
was issued based upon evidence acquired from the two prior warrants. During the final search's execution, BNE agents seized
the contents of Salcido's storage locker. Id. at 451-52.
Salcido and others were charged with multiple counts of precursor chemical trafficking in the United States District Court for
the Western District of New York. Id. at 452. Salcido subsequently motioned to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to
the three warrants. Id. A United States Magistrate found that
the two covert entry warrants contravened the Fourth Amendment and Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
because the warrants failed to provide notice of the search to the
defendant. Id. Nevertheless, the magistrate denied the defendant's motion after finding that the BNE agents acted in good
faith. Id. The district court subsequently directed the magistrate
to produce a more complete record regarding the agents' good
faith efforts. Id.
On remand, the magistrate determined it necessary to impute knowledge of the notice requirement to the agents and,
therefore, concluded that the agents did not act with objective
1249
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good faith. Id. at 453. Accordingly, the magistrate recommended, and the district court accepted, that the evidence be
suppressed. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. Id. at 455. The Second Circuit held that
the Fourth Amendment does not require notice of the execution
of a covert entry warrant. Id. at 449. Accordingly, the Second
Circuit determined that, in the absence of prejudice to the defendant or the government's intentional disregard of the notice
requirement under Rule 41, failure to provide defendant with
notice of a search was not grounds for suppression of the evidence. Id.
Writing for the Second Circuit, Judge Roger Miner began
his discussion of the notice requirement by first examining the
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 453. Judge Miner immediately observed that neither the Amendment's plain language nor any of
its inherent guarantees required notice of searches. Id. Therefore, the court concluded, the Fourth Amendment was not, in
itself, a per se bar to covert entries. Id. (quoting Dalia v. United
States, 441 U.S. 238, 247 (1979)).
After dismissing the Fourth Amendment as the source for
the notice requirement, the court turned to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. Judge Miner noted that
the plain language of Rule 41 compelled the government to give
notice of a search, but only when tangible property was seized.
Id. (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (d)). Turning to related Supreme
Court jurisprudence for further guidance, the Second Circuit observed that Rule 41 did not require such notice prior to a search,
and that intangible property, such as visual information obtained
through a covert search, was included within the scope of the
rule. Id. (citing United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S.

159, 169 (1977); United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504, 509-12 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 827 (1986)) (emphasis added). From
these factors, Judge Miner deduced that Rule 41 mandated notice of a covert search at some time subsequent to its execution.
Id.
To determine the exact time frame for notice to the searched
party, Judge Miner looked to the Ninth Circuit. Id. Recognizing
that the search occurred in California, Judge Miner reasoned that
the BNE agents should have been cognizant of the Ninth Circuit's requirement. Id. The court observed that, barring extenuating circumstances, the Ninth Circuit required that notice be
given within seven days of a search's completion. Id. at 453-54

19931

SURVEY'

(citing United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451,

1251
1456 (9th Cir

1986)). After reviewing the facts and reasoning of the Ninth Circuit's Freitas decision, Judge Miner determined that the Second
Circuit had also adopted the seven-day time frame. Id. (citing
United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 535 (1990)).
Judge Miner pointed out, however, that the Second Circuit
differed from the Ninth Circuit in three important respects. Id. at
454. First, the judge observed, the Second Circuit did not adopt
the language, found in the Freitas court's conclusion, mandating
that a warrant was "constitutionally defective" when not including a notice requirement. Id. Second, the appellate panel discerned that a covert search of intangible items was less intrusive
than found in the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 454-55 (citing United States
v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1337 (2d Cir. 1990)). Finally, Judge
Miner stated that Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, rather than the Fourth Amendment, was the source for the
notice requirement. Id. at 455.
The only remaining question to be answered, according to
the appellate court, was whether a violation of Rule 41 demanded
the employment of the exclusionary rule. Id. The court stated
that evidence would be suppressed for a violation of Rule 41 only
if there was prejudice to the defendant, or if the agents intentionally disregarded the Rule. Id. (citing United States v. Burke, 517
F.2d 377, 386-87 (2d Cir. 1975)).
In applying this standard, Judge Miner first declared that the
search of the storage locker did not prejudice Salcido because the
search would have taken place in the same manner if BNE agents
had followed the Rule's notice requirement. Id. Furthermore,
Judge Miner maintained that the BNE agents' actions suggested
that they did not intentionally disregard the rule. Id. To buttress
this assertion, the court pointed out that BNE agents had sought
advice from an assistant United States attorney and had
presented satisfactory evidence to the municipal judge to establish probable cause. Id.
Finding neither prejudice to Salcido, nor intentional disregard of Rule 41, Judge Miner concluded that the evidence obtained by means of the two covert entry warrants was admissible.
Id. Similarly, Judge Miner deemed admissible the tangible evidence seized under the third warrant. Id. Accordingly, the appellate panel reversed the district court's suppression of the
evidence and remanded the case for further proceedings. Id.
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Few acts are as intrusive as a government search of private
property. Contrary to the court's opinion, privacy expectations
of intangible items require the same strong protections as reasonable searches and seizures of tangible items. No matter the
object of investigation, the owner's coveted privacy is being
compromised.
Nonetheless, Judge Miner very wisely concluded that the absence of a notice provision in a warrant should not, under all circumstances, require the suppression of all evidence seized by
government agents. Although agents must provide notice of covert entries at some point, the seven day requirement, imposed by
the Ninth Circuit and adopted by the Second Circuit, must be
balanced against the needs of law enforcement to proceed with
increasingly long and complex investigations. When agents can
demonstrate the need to delay giving notice, the courts should
accommodate these requests when the evidence suggests that a
delay is reasonably needed. In the present case, the need to delay notifying Salcido was obvious; the agents could not provide
him the opportunity to remove or destroy the chemicals. In this
regard, Judge Miner astutely recognized the government's prevailing interest.
When the judiciary balances the equation in favor of foregoing notice to the searched party, however, the government
should be required to report periodically the ongoing need to
delay notice. Such regular reporting requirements would deter
government abuse of the searched party's right to notice.
Thus, for example, during the three month period between
the second covert search and notice to Salcido, BNE agents
should have presented evidence to the municipal judge for the
continuing need to forego notice to Salcido. The adoption of
such a procedure would allow the government to continue its
surreptitious investigation while affording the searched party
some protection.
Salvatore Picariello
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MENTS SUBMITTED ON AN APPROVAL BASIS UNDER A LETrER OF

CREDIT MAY BE DISHONORED IF ISSUING BANK ACTS ON BENEFICIARY'S DEMAND FOR PAYMENT WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME
UNDER UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICES FOR DOCUMENTARY
CREDITS, ARTICLE 16(c)-Alaska Textile Co., Inc., v. Chase Man-

hattan Bank, N.A., 982 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1992).
Appellant, Alaska Textile Co., Inc. (Alaska), domestically
based in New York, is engaged in the export of fabric from India.
982 F.2d at 817. Lloyd Williams Fashions, Inc. (Lloyd), a manufacturer of women's apparel, contracted with Alaska for the
purchase and delivery of a large quantity of Indian silk for use in
Lloyd's manufacturing operations in Hong Kong. Lloyd directed
appellee, Chase Manhattan Bank (Chase), to issue two letters of
credit in Alaska's favor to assure payment on the contract.
Although the fabric was shipped to Hong Kong on April 2,
1988, Alaska did not provide its collecting bank, Merchants Bank
of New York (Merchants), with the requisite paperwork until
April 26. Upon examining the documents, Merchant's letter of
credit examiner discovered that the documents were nonconforming and stale, the latter of which the examiner noted to be
an incurable defect. Alaska nonetheless directed Merchants to
forward the documents to Chase for payment. In complying with
Alaska's directive, Merchants presented Chase with the documents as well as a form collection letter stating in part: "SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS . . . Documents are presented on an
approval basis," meaning that Alaska was requesting Chase to
have Lloyd waive the discrepancies and authorize payment.
Chase examined the documents on the third and fourth
banking days subsequent to presentment, informed Lloyd of the
problems that justified dishonor and inquired as to whether
Lloyd wished to waive them. Eight banking days later, Chase notified Merchants that the circumstances indeed justified dishonor
of the credits, and that Lloyd had not yet decided whether to authorize payment. Merchants therefore instructed Chase to hold
the documents and await Lloyd's decision. Fifteen banking days
after presentment, despite interim negotiations between the two
companies and a personal request by Alaska's principal, Amnon
Kashi, to Lloyd to authorize payment, Chase formally dishonored
the letters of credit. Id. at 817, 824.
Alaska filed suit against Chase in the New York Supreme
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Court in September, 1988, alleging wrongful dishonor of the
credits. Id. at 817. Acknowledging that the letters of credit were
nonconforming, Alaska nonetheless contended that Chase
should be precluded from relying on the defects. Id. at 817-18.
Specifically, Alaska posited that Chase violated Uniform Customs
and Practices for Documentary Credits (UCP) Article 16(c),
which obligates an issuing bank to provide notice of dishonor to
the beneficiary of a letter of credit within a reasonable time. Id.
at 815, 818. Therefore, according to Alaska, pursuant to Article
16(e)-which prevents an issuer that is in violation of 16(c) from
claiming the documents are non-conforming-Chase was obligated to honor the credits. Id. at 818, 820-21.
Chase removed the action to the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York. Id. at 817. The district
court dismissed the complaint, finding that Alaska waived
Chase's compliance with UCP Article 16(c) by presenting the
documents to Chase "on an approval basis." Id. at 818. Rejecting the district court's waiver analysis, but affirming the dismissal, The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that Chase's dishonor of the letters of credit, submitted "on an approval basis," was proper because Chase had done
so within a reasonable time as prescribed by Article 16(c). Id. at
824.
Writing for an unanimous panel, Circuit Judge McLaughlin
first espoused the commercial utility of letter of credit transactions, emphasizing the dichotomy between the underlying transaction and the letter of credit issued as payment for the
transaction. Id. at 815-16 (citations omitted). The judge observed that "letters of credit are sui generis," and are governed
by unique legal precepts and bodies of law. Id. at 816. Thus, the
judge noted, the UCP-although not law-generally governs letter of credit transactions because issuing banks, such as Chase,
routinely incorporate it into their letter of credit transactions. Id.
(citations omitted).
Commencing its analysis, the court set forth the uncontroverted agreement of the district court and the parties concerning
the meaning of Alaska's submission of documents "on an approval basis"-that the documents were discrepant, and that
Alaska was requesting Chase to ask Lloyd to waive the nonconformities and authorize Chases's payment of the credits. Id. at
818. The court, however, stated that it was confronted with an
issue of first impression-namely, the legal implications of submit-
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ting a letter of credit to an issuing bank for payment "on an approval basis." Id. Because of the total lack of commentary or
reported decisions on the issue, Judge McLaughlin analogized
the presentment of documents "on an approval basis" to the presentment of documents "on a collection basis," noting that the
authority on the latter issue was "persuasive, albeit scant." Id.
According to the court, presentation of documents "on a
collection basis" was subject to two interpretations. Id. First, the
court explained, the phrase could indicate that the documents
were being presented under a letter of credit, amounting to a request by the beneficiary that an issuing bank waive nonconformities in the documents and authorize payment. Id. at 818-19
(quoting RAYMOND JACK, DOCUMENTARY CREDITS 101 (1991)). In
such a case, the court observed, the UCP and all its attendant
rules and duties would be applicable. Id. Second, the court explained, "on a collection basis" could connote that the beneficiary is forwarding documents for simple collection, with the
beneficiary's bank acting merely as an agent and attempting to
procure payment from the buyer. Id. In such a case, the court
stated, the Uniform Rules for Collections, and not the UCP,
would apply. Id.
Rejecting Chase's contention that submission of documents
"on an approval basis" rendered the UCP inapplicable, the court
observed that expert testimony on behalf of both Alaska and
Chase clearly established that Alaska had submitted the documents at issue under the letters of credit. Id. at 819. Thus, equating the presentment of documents "on an approval basis" with
the presentment of documents "on a collection basis" under a letter of credit, the court confirmed the UCP's applicability. Id.
Judge McLaughlin likewise rejected the district court's finding that Alaska waived Chase's obligations under UCP Article
16(c) by submitting the documents "on an approval basis." Id. at
820 (citing Harlow &Jones Ltd. v. American Express Bank Ltd., 2
Lloyd's Rep. 343 (QB. 1990)). Recognizing that a waiver must
be knowing and intentional under New York law, the court found
the record devoid of evidence indicating that Alaska intended to
waive the timely dishonor provisions of Article 16(c). Id. The
court emphasized that the documents at issue incorporated the
UCP, and warned against the casual invocation of equitable doctrines to eviscerate the UCP's applicability. Id. (citations omitted). In the court's view, a successful claim of waiver in the
context of letter of credit transactions-where certainty is para-
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mount in maintaining a free flow of trade-would require a much
stronger showing than that demonstrated by the record. Id.
The Second Circuit, having dispensed with the arguments
against subjecting Chase to Article 16's requirements, then examined whether Chase complied with its provisions. Id. The
court repeated that, under 16(c), Chase had "a reasonable time
in which to examine the documents and to determine.., whether
to take up or to refuse the documents." Id. Further, the court
acknowledged that if Chase did not act in such a timely fashion,
under Article 16(e), it would be forced to honor the credits. Id.
at 820-2 1.
Conceding that the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) could
supplement the UCP in areas where the UCP is silent or ambiguous, the court nevertheless emphatically rejected Alaska's claim
that Article 16(c)'s "reasonable time" should be a maximum of
three banking days as expressed in UCC § 5-112(1). Id. at 822
(citations omitted). Reasoning that the UCP's drafters deliberately avoided setting forth a specific number of days within which
an issuing bank must act, the court refused to establish a precise
time period. Id.
The Second Circuit instead asserted that the UCP's "reasonable time" and the UCC's fixed, three-day time limit, are set
forth, respectively, in the context of two wholly divergent approaches to the consequences of dishonoring letters of credit. Id.
Moreover, according to the court, imposing the UCC's three-day
requirement into Article 16(c) would have the effect of imposing
a uncompromising three-day time limit on issuers. Id. at 823.
The court found this result unacceptable, citing UCC 5112(1)(b), which explicitly allows relaxation of the UCC's threeday rule upon consent, because no one was advocating its incorporation into Article 16(c). Id. Thus, the court argued, a rule
that would impose a strict three-day period into Article 16(c)
would resemble neither the UCC nor the UCP, thus "bastardiz[ing]" both. Id.
The Court therefore concluded that "reasonable time" is a
fluid concept, dependant on the factual scenario of each case,
and to be determined in view of the practices of others engaged
in letter of credit transactions. Id. Judge McLaughlin noted that
Chase examined the documents at issue on the third and fourth
days following presentment, and asked Lloyd-at Alaska's behest-if it wished to waive the discrepancies. Id. at 824. Additionally, the judge stipulated, Chase complied with Merchant's
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directive to hold the documents pending Lloyd's decision
whether to authorize payment. Id. According to the court, after
Chase proceeded as asked, the matter was simply beyond its
control.
The circuit court maintained that penalizing issuers for holding their actions in abeyance pending the account party's authorization of payment of documents that are presented "on an
approval basis" would interfere with the efficacy of commercial
trade. Id. Indeed, the court perceived, issuers would always dishonor credits in the absence of an immediate waiver-generally
an unfavorable result. Id. Buttressed by this reasoning, the court
held that Chase dishonored the letter of credit within a reasonable time as prescribed by UCP Article 16(c) and affirmed the
district court's judgment dismissing Alaska's complaint. Id.
The Second Circuit noted in Alaska that many letters of
credit presented for payment are non-conforming. Given this apparently commonplace occurrence, the court's interpretation of
"reasonable time" and "on an approval basis" allows the parties
to a transaction governed by the UCP to maintain at least some
degree of flexibility in a commercial practice that, by its nature,
demands precision. Faced with discrepant documents, parties to
a credit can "safely" contemplate the proper course of action instead of immediately refusing payment-thus facilitating the free
flow of commerce. Nonetheless, issuing banks are still confronted with the uncertainty of precisely when they must act on a
beneficiary's request for payment. The court, however, properly
refrained from ruling in contravention of the plain language of
Article 16(c)-awaiting instead the expected revision of the UCP.
Donna L. Salerno

BANKRUPTCY-ASSIGNMENT

OF RENTS-POST-PETITION

RENTS

SUBJECT TO ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS CLAUSE IN PROPERLY RECORDED DEEDS OF TRUST CONSTITUTE CASH COLLATERAL
FROM THE TIME OF COMMENCEMENT OF THE CASE AND FAILURE TO FILE A FINANCING STATEMENT RENDERS SECURITY INTEREST IN ESCROW ACCOUNT VOIDABLE BY TRUSTEE-In
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Vienna Park Properties, 976 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1992).

In 1984, Congressional Mortgage Corporation (Congres-
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sional) made loans to Vienna Park Properties (Vienna Park), a
limited partnership, for the purchase of 300 condominium units.
Id. at 109. The loan was secured by individual deeds of trust on
each unit, which were properly recorded. The loan was further
secured by a rent assignment clause in favor of Congressional,
contained in each deed of trust.
The Congressional loan did not cover the entire purchase
price, thus the balance was financed through Vienna Park Associates (VPA), the seller of the condominiums. This second loan
was secured by 300 second deeds of trust granted by Vienna Park
in favor of VPA, each subordinate to the deeds held by Congressional. Id. at 109-10. Additionally, VPA and Vienna Park established an escrow account, to be held during the loan period by a
bank, for use by a VPA designated management agent in managing the properties. Id. at 110. Upon repayment of the loan to
VPA, Vienna Park retained the right to receive the residue of the
escrow account. Vienna Park assigned this right to Congressional as further security on the loan from that bank.
Subsequently, Congressional assigned the deeds of trust to
Trustbank Federal Savings Bank and United Postal Savings Association (collectively referred to as "the Banks"), with the Banks
receiving 138 and 162 deeds, respectively. By way of assignment,
each of the Banks also received a proportionate share of Congressional's security interest in Vienna Park's right to the escrow
account residue.
Vienna Park made no payments to the Banks afterJuly 1989.
In August 1989, both banks notified Vienna Park of this default,
and declared that the obligation would be accelerated if not
cured within thirty days. United Postal accelerated its part of the
loan in September, 1989, and on October 30, 1989, both banks
demanded from Vienna Park rents received on the properties, in
accordance with the assignment of rents provisions contained in
the deeds of trust. The Banks also initiated foreclosure proceedings in late October 1989, but on November 21, 1989, before
foreclosure was complete, Vienna Park filed a petition under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, thus staying the foreclosure
proceedings.
The Banks moved before the bankruptcy court on December
29, 1989, for sequestration of the rents on the grounds that the
rents constituted "cash collateral" and were thus entitled to special protection under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. After
initially agreeing with the Banks, the bankruptcy court reversed
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itself sua sponte and held that the rents were not cash collateral
because the Banks had not taken the requisite action, under Virginia law, to enforce the security interest prior to the filing of the
bankruptcy petition. Id. (citing In re Vienna Park Properties, 120
B.R. 332, 338 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990)).
On appeal, the district court reversed. Id. (citing In re Vienna
Park Properties, 136 B.R. 43, 53-55). The court stated that because
the Banks had recorded the deeds of trust containing the rent
assignment provisions, the security interest in the rents was perfected. Id. at 110-11. Thus, although enforcement of the security interest was barred by the automatic stay, the court held the
security interest in rents to be cash collateral. Id. at 111. The
court concluded that the Banks were entitled to rents from the
time of the motion to sequester the rents, and Vienna Park appealed. Id.
In a separate proceeding in the bankruptcy court, Vienna
Park asserted that the Banks' security interests in the right to receive the residue of the escrow account were unperfected, and
thus that the rights to the residue were property of the estate. Id.
The bankruptcy court ruled that the Banks' failure to file a financing statement rendered the Banks' security interests in the general intangible unperfected. Id. The bankruptcy court therefore
concluded that security interests were subject to the trustee's
avoidance power under section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code, and
the district court affirmed. Id.
In a consolidated appeal, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit affirmed both district court rulings. Id.
Writing for the panel, ChiefJudge Meskill first raised the issue of
whether the assigned rents were properly classified, under Bankruptcy Code section 363, as cash collateral. Id. Resolution of
this question, the court stated, demanded exacting analysis of the
Bankruptcy Code as well as applicable non-bankruptcy law. Id.
Bankruptcy Code section 541(a)(6), the chief judge began,
dictates that rents arising from use of property of the estate constitute property of the estate which the trustee is typically free to
use. Id. The chiefjudge recognized that the trustee's unfettered
use of these funds is limited by two Code provisions, section 363
and section 552(b). Id. Section 363, ChiefJudge Meskill related,
prohibits the debtor from using cash collateral absent court approval or consent by each entity holding an interest in the cash
collateral. Id. This section, the court declared, defines "cash collateral" as cash or cash equivalents in which both the estate and
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another entity have an interest. Id. The chief judge explained
that this definition encompasses rents originating from property
subject to a security interest, as set forth in section 552(b). Id.
Section 552(b), the court observed, provides that a security
interest in rents created pre-petition extends to post-petition
rents acquired by the bankruptcy estate, if so provided by applicable nonbankruptcy law and in the security agreement. Id. at
111-12. The court declared that the applicable law was Virginia
law, as the relevant properties were located in Virginia. After examining the language of the security agreement, the court determined that the rent assignment clauses in the deeds of trust
constituted a valid security agreement covering the post-petition
rents. Id. at 112. The court stated that the Banks' failure to enforce the security interest by possession of the collateral prior to
bankruptcy was not fatal to the existence of the interest, but
merely rendered the interest inchoate. Id. at 112-13.
The court of appeals concluded that the rents were cash collateral, as the Banks held an interest in the rents that continued
in bankruptcy pursuant to section 552(b), and because the rents
fell within the section 363 definition of cash collateral. Id. at 113.
Chief Judge Meskill clarified that the rents were cash collateral
from the time the bankruptcy case commenced, not merely from

the time of the Banks' motion for sequestration. Id. at 114.
Although the steps requisite to enforcement of the Banks' security interest were not completed before bankruptcy, and could not
be perfected in bankruptcy due to the automatic stay of section
362, the court declared that recordation of the deeds of trust had
rendered the security interest a properly perfected security interest constituting cash collateral and entitled to the protections of

section 363. Id.
Chief Judge Meskill next addressed the competing claims of
the Banks and the estate regarding the funds remaining in the
escrow account. Id. The chief judge remarked that under the
terms of the escrow agreement, Vienna Park was to receive the
balance of funds in the account upon termination of the agreement. Id. at 114-15. The chiefjudge noted that Vienna Park had
assigned its rights to the residue to the Banks, and that the Banks
had failed to file financing statements to perfect these security
interests. Id. at 115. The court thus considered whether the

Banks' security interests were voidable under section 544 of the
Bankruptcy Code, which gives the trustee the power to avoid certain security interests. Id.
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Perfection of these security interests, the court stated, was
governed by Virginia law, specifically that state's version of UCC
Article Nine. Id. The court observed that under this law, the
method of perfection of a security interest varies depending on
the type of collateral, with the filing of a financing statement generally required. Id.
The court of appeals acknowledged that possession by an
agent of a secured party can result in perfection of a security interest in "money," but rejected the Banks' argument that the security interests in question were collateralized by "money." Id. at
116. Conversely, the court noted that at the time Vienna Park
granted the security interests, it had no present unencumbered
right to access the escrow funds, but merely a contractual right to
receive the residue at an unspecified future time. Id. The court
concluded that the collateral was not "money," and the failure of
the Banks to file financing statements rendered the security interests voidable by the trustee under Bankruptcy Code section 544.
Id. at 117.
In re Vienna Park Properties clarifies the proper treatment of
rent assignment clauses in bankruptcy. Because rents subject to
a perfected but unenforced security interest are classified as cash
collateral in bankruptcy, a debtor must secure court approval or
creditor consent before using the funds. This effectively provides the secured creditor an added procedural safeguard not
available under state law. Outside bankruptcy, the secured creditor would be required to take the additional, perhaps costly and
time consuming, step of attaining possession of the properties to
ensure enforcement of the security interest in the rents. Failure
to take possession would leave the debtor free to deplete the
funds. This added procedural safeguard is not inequitable, however, given that in bankruptcy, creditors are precluded from protecting their rights through enforcement procedures due to the
automatic stay.
The Second Circuit declined to impose a requirement that
creditors take affirmative action in the bankruptcy court to protect their entitlement to rents. This approach is sensible; if a
creditor has already perfected an interest under the applicable
state law (for example, by recordation of a real property interest),
it would seem unduly burdensome to require the creditor to take
further action to safeguard that interest. Moreover, divesting a
secured creditor of such an interest may implicate Fifth Amendment takings concerns.
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Vienna Park also reaffirms that the failure of a secured creditor to file a financing statement, and thus properly perfect a security interest, will render the security interest subject to the
trustee's section 544 avoidance powers. The Banks may have neglected to file financing statements based on the belief that the
escrow fund would be of little value upon termination of the escrow agreement. Alternatively, the Banks may have believed that
possession of the funds by the escrow agent was sufficient to perfect the Banks' interests. Because the Banks were not a direct
party to the escrow agreement, however, they held only an interest in the rights of another party to the money, not a direct interest in the funds. Thus, Vienna Park makes clear the distinction
between collateral that is a sum certain upon default, and collateral that is merely the right to receive an unspecified sum on the
occurrence of both default and conditions precedent. This fine
distinction illustrates that creditors must diligently protect their
rights, or risk losing them in bankruptcy.
Scott Christopher Shelley

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION-NEW YORK DE-

PARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION'S
ERAL

DISADVANTAGED

IMPLEMENTATION

ENTERPRISES

SET-ASIDE

OF FEDPROGRAM

DOES NOT VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE-Harrison &

Burrowes Bridge Constructors,Inc. v. Cuomo, 981 F.2d 50 (2d Cir.

1992).
The plaintiffs, two New York corporations, both whollyowned by white males and involved in the business of contracting
state highway projects, were denied state contracts involving
both federally-assisted projects and state-funded projects. 981
F.2d at 52-53, 55. The first, United Fence and Guardrail Corporation (United Fence), a subcontractor, submitted bids to general
contractors, who in turn quoted bids on construction projects for

the New York Department of Transportation (NYDOT). Id. at
53. The other, Harrison & Burrowes Bridge Constructors, Inc.
(Harrison), submitted bids directly to the NYDOT as a prime
contractor.
In a suit filed in the United States District Court for the
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Northern District of New York, United Fence and Harrison sued
state officials alleging that a federal set-aside program using federal funds on state highway construction and a New York statute
providing similar set-asides for minority enterprises denied them
equal protection. Id. at 53. Specifically, United Fence contended
that during a four and one-half year period it was awarded only
two contracts out of a possible 125 state contracts on which it
bid, with a significant share of the contracts being advanced to a
choice number of minority enterprises. Id. at 55. Harrison alleged that it was denied the opportunity to work on two state
contracts even though it was the lowest bidder on each. Id. One
of the contracts encompassed a federally-assisted project, the
goal of which the NYDOT determined would be a twelve percent
minority goal and a two percent women-owned set-aside goal.
Id. at 55-56. Harrison, as general contractor on its proffered contract, procured minority business participation of less than two
percent. Id. at 56. The next lowest bidder was granted the contracts as the state ascertained that Harrison had not made a
good-faith effort to fulfill the state's goal. Id.
The district court initially determined that United Fence, being despoiled of the occasion to vie for NYDOT projects because
of the set-asides for minority firms, suffered cognizable injuries
traceable to NYDOT's conduct, thereby affording the corporation standing. Id. at 55-56. The district court then granted Harrison's motion for preliminary injunction as to New York's
disadvantaged enterprises program, but denied a preliminary injunction as to New York's implementation of the federal program. Id. at 56.
At trial, the district court, recognizing that New York's disadvantaged enterprises program had been suspended, dismissed as
moot plaintiffs' requests for permanent injunctive and declaratory relief. Id. The district court also denied plaintiffs' equal
protection challenge to the federal program. Id. As an ancillary
issue, the district court denied relief in the form of damages
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, grounded in the qualified immunity of
named state officials. Id. at 53, 56.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
granted certification to determine: (1) whether New York's implementation of the federally authorized minority set-aside program and New York's disadvantaged enterprises program
violated the Equal Protection Clause; (2) whether suspension of
the New York disadvantage business program mooted the ques-
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tion of its constitutionality; (3) whether state officials were
shielded from civil rights suit under the doctrine of qualified immunity. Id. at 53, 58, 61. After reviewing the facts and law, the
Second Circuit affirmed each of the district court's decisions. Id.
at 62.
Judge Cardamone began the appellate panel's opinion by
providing a detailed analysis of the overriding federal statutory
and constitutional framework. Id. at 53-55. The court's first line
of study, engrossing New York's implementation of the federally
authorized minority set-aside program, found that the Surface
Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 and its successor, the Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of
1987 (collectively Acts), "were designed to achieve stated minority business participation goals primarily through the use of setasides for qualified subcontractors." Id. at 53 (citing S. Rep. No.
4, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1987), reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 66, 76). Furthermore, the court observed, the two
statutes mandated that the minority-owned business and womenowned business participation goals for projects under the two
Acts were to be no less than ten percent. Id. New York became
involved, the court observed, because receipt of federal funds
under the Acts, absent a waiver, is dependent upon the state establishing minority participation goals on federally-funded
projects. Id. at 54. NYDOT's plan, complying in all significant
respects with the USDOT's regulations, the court noted, was
adopted and approved with the notable minority set-aside goal of
seventeen percent for fiscal years 1988-1990. Id.
Further expounding on the background to the appellants'
challenges, the court turned to an analysis of New York's comprehensive state program regarding minority set-aside programs.
Id. The court found the conclusive guiding principle in the enactment of the program to be "[an] increase [in] the participation of minority-owned business enterprises on contracts
awarded by state agencies, including those awarded by the
NYDOT." Id. (citing N.Y. Exec. Law Art. 15-A, §§ 310-18 (Consol. Supp. 1991)). The court noted that, as with the federal program, New York had detailed regulation to implement its statute.
Id. at 55.
Lurking in the constitutional background, the court noted,
was City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), a case
concerning the constitutionality of state set-aside programs, and
which presented some problems for New York. Id. The court
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acknowledged that because New York's program implicated constitutional questions under Croson, the state agency had promulgated a final rule suspending the requirement that contractors
exercise good-faith efforts to meet the state's goal for minority
hiring. Id. at 55. The suspension, stated the court, was effective
until such time as the agency demonstrates a factual basis that
"as to minority enterprises a compelling state interest supports
. . . participation goals [and in regard to] women-owned enterprises, a constitutionally-sufficient state interest supports the
goals." Id. The court tersely found that the good faith requirement has gone unenforced. Id.
Against this framework, the court analyzed the constitutional
claims of United Fence and Harrison. Id. at 56. The court first
addressed the appropriate standard of review. Id. In framing the
issue, the court queried whether New York, in its implementing
the federal program and application to individual contracts, must
justify set-aside percentages above the congressionally-mandated
ten percent minimum under a more "stringent strict scrutiny
standard of review [than that] required for wholly state-authorized programs." Id. Citing Croson as the source of this strict scrutiny standard, the Second Circuit noted the Supreme Court had
invalidated, under the Equal Protection Clause, the thirty percent
minority enterprise set-aside program of the City of Richmond,
Virginia because there was neither compelling governmental interest nor a narrowly tailored statute. Id.
After setting forth the constitutional standard, the court differentiated Croson with United Fence's and Harrison's claims by
observing that Croson involved a non-federal program, whereas
the case at bar concerned a federal program. Id. The court, delving into Croson's precedent, found that Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448 (1980), had been distinguished in Croson, and resolved
the issue subjudice. Id. In analyzing Fullilove, the Second Circuit
explicated that based on evidence of denial of minority participation in "public contracting opportunities," a federal minority setaside program could withstand an equal protection challenge. Id.
at 56-57. Thejudge proposed that for the NYDOT to implement
unconstitutionally the "authorized-by-Congress set-asides," the
NYDOT must have exceeded its authority under the federal program. Id. Determining the state and federal statutory schemata
to be parallel in scope, the court found valid the NYDOT's implementation of the federal program. Id.
The court then addressed the appellants' two substantive
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challenges to NYDOT's implementation of the federal program:
the seventeen percent set-asides exceeding the ten percent minimum federal requirement, and that the NYDOT's procedures for
setting annual and individual contract goals were unlawful. Id.
The court dispelled the first argument by noting that appellants
can neither contest the constitutionality of the state's implementation of the federal program, nor, absent an evidentiary basis of
NYDOT's deviation from valid federal regulations, challenge the
program "as applied" to them by means of the state implementing regulations. Id.
The court then set forth the appellants' position as being
that, because the NYDOT promulgated goals above ten percent,
the department may not rely on federal authority, but must apply
Croson to uphold the additional set-aside. Id. Relying on the statute's plain language and legislative history, the court rebuffed the
appellants' position and held that New York's seventeen percent
set-aside comported with the federal mandate. Id. The court,
however, declined to pass on an issue left open: the outcome of a
state attempt to implement a set-aside "vastly greater" that the
ten percent federal minimum. Id. at 57-58.
As to the appellants' second argument regarding New York's
process for classifying disadvantaged enterprises, the court
found the flexibility of the NYDOT's procedures involving good
faith efforts do not conflict with the federal regulations. Id. at 58.
Minding precedent, the court commented that other circuits
found the state's details valid if state implementation of the Congressional mandate closely paralleled federal set-aside regulations. Id.
The court next turned to New York's disadvantaged enterprises program, which included within its scope non-federally
funded projects. Id. The court focused its inquiry on whether
the district court, in analyzing the state's suspension of set-aside
goal enforcement, was correct in rendering the issue as moot. Id.
at 58-59. Noting that voluntary cessation of illegal conduct does
not necessarily deprive a federal court of its jurisdiction, Judge
Cardamone nonetheless determined that the suspension lacked
selective discontinuance of enforcement or the possibility of repetition. Id. at 59. The court noted New York's decision, in light
of Croson, to develop a factual basis for assessing localized discrimination and a supporting set-aside remedy for it. Id. The
court stated that United Fence and Harrison, to combat this ruling, argued that post-hoc factual development of implementing
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regulations will not change the set-aside program as initially contemplated and enacted, therefore, the issue is not moot. Id.
The Second Circuit responded by finding in the statute sufficient flexibility and deference granted to the state agencies as to
find constitutional merit within the statute. Id. at 60. The court
found that proper construction of the statute's language allowed
mere good faith efforts in soliciting minority participation in state
contracts. Id. To buttress the New York program's validity, the
court employed the doctrine of construing a statute in a manner
that avoided unnecessary constitutional difficulties. Id.
The court, in fleshing out the appellants' arguments, stated
that the next challenge to the constitutionality to Article 15-A involved their assertion that Article 15-A must be appraised on the
discriminatory record, if that be the case, as it existed in New
York State's construction industry at the date of the statute's
adoption. Id. The court rejected this argument by opining that
the state, in assessing the necessity of an affirmative action plan,
can rely on any evidence that it thinks is constitutionally warranted, whether it be before or after the program's enactment.
Id.
As a corollary to this analysis, the court commented that future dissection of the program's enforcement will be viewed
under Croson's interpretative umbrella, because only then can the
particular findings designed to bolster the set-asides be evaluated
in relation to its scrutinizing standard. Id. The court noted that
although agency findings had been made regarding whether a
"factual basis demonstrat[ing] a compelling state interest supports requiring good faith efforts by contractors to meet minority
enterprise goals and that a constitutionally-sufficient state interest exist[ed] to support requiring those efforts as to womenowned enterprises," they had not been published at the time of
the opinion. Id. Even given this, the court found the issue to not
yet be justiciable because the findings had neither been published nor had they been enforced. Id. at 60-61. The Second
Circuit thereafter agreed with the district court's dismissal of the
declaratory and injunctive relief already asked for as being moot.
Id. at 61.
The court then turned to the viability of appellants claims
for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because they remained intact due to the disadvantaged enterprises program's past application. Id. The Second Circuit analyzed the district court's
explanation of immunity. Id. The court stated that the defend-
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ants were shielded if the discretionary function exercised in their
official capacity was reasonable. Id. Moreover, the court stated,
the right purportedly infringed had to be identifiable by the official. Id. The court framed the issue as being whether, before
Croson, state set-aside programs were narrowly tailored to meet a
compelling governmental interest, with a record of prior local
discrimination an unequivocal requirement before realizing the
minority preferences. Id.
Judge Cardamone found that the pre-Croson minority-preference law was amorphous. Id. Accordingly, the judge posited that
it was reasonable to rely on the prevailing view that an affirmative
action plan could be set into motion based on Congress's conclusions industry-wide discrimination. Id.
The court, addressing United Fence's and Harrison's challenges to post-Croson conduct of the state, found that because
Croson's case-by-case analysis focused on unique local plans, New
York's public officials would not necessarily have determined the
regulations patently unconstitutional, even under Croson's strict
scrutiny standard. Id. at 61-62. The court therefore affirmed the
district court's proposition and ruled that qualified immunity
protected the state officials. Id. at 62.
Harrison & Burrowes presented the Second Circuit with the
perfunctory task of deciding, under the Equal Protection Clause,
the constitutionality of New York's implementation of the federal
highway fund set-aside program, as well as New York's state disadvantaged enterprises program.
In finding New York's implementation of the federal setaside program valid, the court correctly determined that equal
protection of the laws had not been violated. Initial analysis of
the two governing federal highway statutes found the stated
goals of the acts to be relief from demonstrated past minority
discrimination by utilizing set-asides to foster minority business
participation. The clear implementing regulations promulgated
by the USDOT called for participation goals of not less than ten
percent. Judge Cardamone summarily dismissed the appellants'
arguments that New York's additional seven percent mandate, to
pass constitutional muster, called for greater scrutiny. Given the
Court's command in Croson, the appellate panel's ruling was
correct.
The Second Circuit's analysis of Fullilove and Croson is airtight. Harrison and United Fence had no basis upon which to
proffer their constitutional arguments. Judge Cardamone cor-
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rectly determined that Fullilove conclusively established that federal set-aside programs may endure an equal protection
challenge. In line with this analysis, the court also resolved the
consequent issue correctly in favor of the State of New York. Insofar as the state scheme was virtually identical to the federal
statutory framework, constitutional validity could be the only
conclusion.
The seventeen percent set-aside goal was permissible as it
was, under the federal statutory language, "at least ten percent."
The court correctly noted that the constitutionality of a state's
attempt at a set-aside goal "vastly greater" than the federal minimum was an issue for later adjudication. Without such a reservation, states could implement laws that deny its citizens,
particularly contractors soliciting federally-funded state projects,
equal protection of the laws.
The court jumped to a hasty conclusion, however, in deeming this case inappropriate to decide the issue left open in Fullilove, i.e., the constitutionality of a federal set-aside program in a
particular cases. The opinion fails to explain why this case was
not amenable; and, in fact, it quite possibly could have been.
As to the second challenge to New York's implementation,
i.e., the procedures for classifying disadvantaged enterprises, the
court's relaxed view and deference to individual states' procedures for classification is laudable. Keeping in mind the distinct
sovereign differences that obtain in the Second Circuit, the court
granted New York its deserved deference. Closely paralleling the
federal regulations, while providing avenues of relief thought
necessary for effective program implementation, New York's flexible standard was granted the requisite respect.
Judge Cardamone erred when confronted with New York's
own disadvantaged enterprises program. Although it reasonably
found that the issue of the validity of the program's set-aside
goals was rendered moot pursuant Croson's suspension of the
good faith efforts requirements, the Second Circuit lost sight of
the traditional due process homing beacon when ruling on the
validity of post-hoc evidentiary rationalization.
Harrison and United Fence correctly argued that evidence of
discrimination engrafted upon a pre-existing statute is inapposite. Legislation, as well as its implementing regulations, are to
be enacted only upon a preliminary finding of discrimination in
regard to business opportunities. Evidence obtained after the
fact bears no relation to a previously-enacted directive. Such ma-
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neuvers are seen as subjectively crafting the means to reach an
predetermined end.
Nonetheless, the court correctly noted that the evidence was
not a problem at the time of the opinion and therefore did not
obtain in its analysis, that is, it was unripe for adjudication. This
aspect is the key to future success for parties such as Harrison
and United Fence, as when the evidence is publicly disclosed, the
court's allowance of post-hoc rationalization is an issue ripe for
review. Under this analysis, Croson would not yet even be relevant. Only when the previous issue is resolved can litigants employ Croson to challenge the state set-aside program as invalid.
Vindicating this judicial miscue, the Second Circuit appropriately concluded with an analysis of the appellants' damage
claims. Given the justified leeway that public officials have in
making official decisions, the court found, in light of the pre- and
post-Croson state of affairs, that the state's discretionary decisions
did not rise to the level of damages. The court noted that, in
determining goals based on congressional conclusions regarding
industry-wide discrimination, the state's pre-Croson set-aside programs were not unreasonable. The court's finding rings true because, subsequent to Fullilove, states were in limbo regarding the
suitable standards to use to determine goals for their own sovereign plans. The utilization of Congress's conclusions was as constitutionally sound as any other basis; therefore the no-liability
conclusion was correct. The same result obtains in regard to
post-Croson analysis. As Croson involved a case-by-case analysis
based on discrimination in a particularized location or sovereign,
New York's actions were valid as what was unconstitutional in
one case might not be so in another.
Although it is extremely difficult to confront a challenge
grounded in the equal protection clause, the Second Circuit in
Harrison & Burrowes commendably rendered a lucid opinion, albeit incorrect in one aspect. Harrison's and United Fence's
claims in regard to New York's implementation of the federal setaside program and their own program had no real merit. The
court, however, was willing to rely on evidence gathered after the
fact to prove that a prior condition existed. This approach completely contravenes sound legislative policy and subsequent judicial review.
Henry W. Wilson
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IMMIGRATION

LAW-JURISDICTION-JUDICIAL
REVIEW
OF
HABEAS CORPUS PETITION CHALLENGING A DEPORTATION ORDER Is BARRED WHEN AN ALIEN HAS DEPARTED FROM THE
UNITED STATES SUBSEQUENT TO THE ORDER'S ISSUANCE-

Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993).
In 1981, Orlando Roldan (Roldan), a citizen and native of
Columbia, entered the United States without examination or approval from the United States Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS). 984 F.2d 86. Roldan was subsequently convicted
of first degree assault by a Dutchess, New York County Court in
1987. The county court sentenced Roldan to a prison term consisting of two to six years. Roldan was released on parole from
state prison in 1988 and placed in INS custody.
Subsequent to a deportation hearing, the INS deported
Roldan from the United States to Columbia in 1988. In the year
following Roldan's deportation, he again entered the United
States without INS inspection or approval. Shortly thereafter,
Roldan was arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI). In
1988, Roldan's DWI and reentry into the United States were de-

termined to violate his parole. Consequently, Roldan's parole
was revoked and he was returned to state prison.
During 1990, while Roldan was confined in state prison, the
INS commenced a proceeding to deport him. The grounds for
the deportation were Roldan's unapproved reentry into the
United States and his 1987 assault conviction. The INS placed a
detainer against Roldan with state prison personnel so that

Roldan could be placed in INS custody upon expiration of his
state prison sentence.
In 1991, Roldan filed a pro se writ of habeas corpus petition
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of New York. Roldan asserted that the INS
failed to inform him of his legal rights during the deportation
hearing in 1988. More specifically, Roldan was unaware that he
might defend against deportation because of his 1983 marriage
to an American citizen. Further, Roldan did not know that a subsequent return to the United States would violate his parole.
In response, the INS moved to dismiss Roldan's petition for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The INS asserted that Roldan

was not in INS custody because the detainer filed against Roldan
did not meet the requisite custody for habeas corpus jurisdiction.
On September 10, 1991 Magistrate Judge Ralph W. Smith,
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Jr. reported his recommendations. Id. at 86-87. The magistrate
judge proposed to dismiss Roldan's petition for not meeting the
requisite "in custody" element of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (c)(3). Id. The
magistrate noted that Roldan's current incarceration in state
prison was not a result of an unfair deportation hearing. Id. at
87. Magistrate Smith further declared that the INS detainer did
not put Roldan in INS custody to support Roldan's habeas petition. Id.
Magistrate Smith's recommendations were served upon the
parties by certified mail. Id. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the
parties were notified and given ten days to report written objections. Neither party filed objections. Id. Consequently, on October 29, 1991, Judge Howard G. Munson, sitting in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of New York, entered an order approving Magistrate Smith's recommendations
and dismissing Roldan's petition. Id. In January, 1992, Before
the INS deported him, Roldan filed for an appeal to the United
States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, and the district court
granted a certificate of probable cause. Id.
Writing for the court, Circuit Judge Mahoney began the
analysis by examining Roldan's challenge to his state prison custody. Id. The circuit judge was quick to recognize that Roldan's
habeas petition challenged only the INS's 1988 deportation hearing. Id. The circuit court judge noted that although Roldan contested his incarceration upon deportation hearing violations,
Roldan did not challenge the state proceedings that precipitated
the first degree assault convictions. Id.
Circuit Judge Mahoney then turned to the relevant federal
habeas corpus relief statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) and §
2254(a). Id. The circuit court judge declared that even if the INS
failed to inform Roldan at the 1988 deportation hearing that illegal reentry into the United States would violate his parole, imprisonment as a result of such a parole violation did not satisfy
grounds for habeas relief under the statutes. Id. The circuit
judge also noted that Roldan's DWI conviction, another basis for
parole revocation, was not related to the 1988 deportation hearing. Id. The circuit court judge concluded that Roldan had not
put forth an adequate challenge to his state custody. Id.
Circuit Judge Mahoney next analyzed Roldan's challenge to
the INS detainer. Id. The circuit court judge initially noted that
the court would analyze Roldan's pro se habeas petition liberally,
which would then include arguments against the INS detainer.
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Id. The circuit court acknowledged that the magistrate judge assumed the same liberal interpretation of Roldan's petition in determining that the I.N.S. detainer did not place Roldan within
custody to satisfy statutory habeas corpus relief against the INS.
Id. at 87-88.
The circuit court judge then recognized the majority view
with regard to the meaning of an INS detainer and the "in custody" requisites of § 2241(c)(3) and § 2254. Id. at 88. Circuit
Judge Mahoney stated that a majority of the courts have held that
the detainer provided notice that INS custody would occur at the
end of a prisoner's incarceration. Id. The circuit court judge also
noted that the INS detainer constituted a request for notice by
prison officials to the INS regarding the expected prison release
date. Id. The circuit judge then stressed that the detainer, upon
its filing, did not result in any present confinement by the INS.
Id.

The circuit court judge next highlighted other jurisdictions'
case law, which held contrary to the majority view. Id. (citations
omitted). The circuit court noted that these jurisdictions held
that an INS detainer effected a "technical custody" of the prisoner by the INS. Id. The circuit court also discussed a recent
Seventh Circuit court case that remanded to the district court the
issue of whether an INS detainer constituted simple notice or request to detain a prisoner after sentencing had expired until the
INS could take custody, thereby establishing INS custody upon
filing. Id. (citing Vargas v. Swan, 854 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1988)).
The circuit court noted that the Sixth Circuit had rejected the
rationale espoused by the Seventh Circuit court in Vargas. Id.
(citing Prieto v. Gluch, 913 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1990)).
Circuit Judge Mahoney then skirted a decision regarding the
INS detainer by turning to events that occurred subsequent to
the magistrate judge's recommendations. Id. at 89. The circuit
judge began by stating that the general rule within the Second
Circuit precluded further judicial review of a magistrate's decision. Id. The circuit court judge enunciated that an untimely objection to a magistrate's recommendation effectively waived any
subsequent judicial review of that recommendation. Id. (citing
Small v. Secretary Of Health And Human Services, 892 F.2d 15 (2d

Cir. 1989)). CircuitJudge Mahoney also stated that this rule was
refined with regard to pro se litigants and would be operative
only if the magistrate's report explicitly mandated that objections
be filed within ten days. Id. The circuit judge then pointed out
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that the recommendation Roldan acknowledged receiving satisfied the rule's requirements and that Roldan did not file any objections within the ten day period. Id. The circuit court judge
also noted that there were no interests ofjustice sufficient to support a departure from the rule enunciated in Small. Id.
Circuit Judge Mahoney then addressed a more fundamental
problem with Roldan's appeal. Id. The circuit judge commenced
the analysis by noting federal statutory law that precluded a court
from reviewing an order of deportation once an alien has departed from the United States subsequent to the deportation order's issuance. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c)). The circuit court
judge clarified the court's understanding that Roldan's 1992 deportation, as opposed to Roldan's 1988 deportation, would be
the basis for utilizing § 1105a(c)'s judicial review bar. Id. The
circuit court judge then highlighted that a conflict among various
circuit courts on interpretation of § 1105a(c) existed. Id. (citations omitted).
The circuit judge initially noted that the Ninth Circuit interpreted that departure from the United States for § 1105a(c) purposes must be in compliance with procedural due process as
articulated in the seminal case of Mendez v. INS, 563 F.2d 956
(9th Cir. 1977). Id. Circuit Judge Mahoney noted that subsequent Ninth Circuit holdings have followed Mendez and that the
Sixth Circuit endorsed this interpretation. Id. at 89-90. The circuit judge pointed out, however, that other circuit courts such as
the Fifth, Tenth and District of Columbia Circuits refused to follow the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of section 1105a(c). Id. at
90.
In closing, Circuit Judge Mahoney refused to follow the
Ninth Circuit's view and stressed that the clear language in the
statute created a jurisdictional bar to hear Roldan's appeal. Id.
The circuit judge noted that to hold otherwise would render the
statute "virtually without effect." Id. CircuitJudge Mahoney also
articulated that Congress had the constitutional authority to enact § 1105a(c)'s jurisdictional limitation. Id. More specifically,
the circuit court judge referenced Article I, section 8, clause 9
and Article III, section 1 of the Constitution. Id. at 90-91. Refusing to undermine the jurisdictional bar in section 1105a(c), the
Second Circuit dismissed Roldan's appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 91.
In Roldan, the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, recognized and followed the clear congressional mandate of
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28 U.S.C. § 1105a(c). Indeed, the circuit court acknowledged
that circumventing a statute would threaten to eviscerate it. Because our Constitution has empowered Congress with the ability
to create jurisdiction-limiting legislation, courts should seek to
follow rather than usurp such legislative pronouncements.
Lincoln A. Terzian

